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In the first two parts of our series on the new Swiss transparency rules, we covered the direct (Art. 1 TLEO) and indirect holding of shareholdings (Art. 2 TLEO) under the Ordinance on the Transparency of Legal Entities (TLEO). Both provisions are linked to percentage shareholdings. Art. 3 TLEO leaves this ground: it captures anyone who controls a legal entity without reaching the shareholding threshold – in extreme cases without holding a single share or other equity security. The provision is the most open-ended in the entire Ordinance and, in practice, the most demanding. This article explains how it is structured, where its limits lie and how veto rights, loan covenants, positions as officers and family relationships can be distinguished from one another.
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Structure: strictly distinguish between subject matter (para. 1) and means (para. 2)
Art. 3 TLEO specifies the second variant of the statutory concept of control under Art. 4 para. 1 of the Federal Act on the Transparency of Legal Entities (TLEA) – control ‘by other means’. The provision has two parts, and this division is the key to applying it correctly. Para. 1 describes what the control must relate to and sets out three scenarios:
- the right or the actual ability to appoint or remove more than half of the members of the executive or administrative body (let. a);
- a veto over resolutions of the competent bodies on one of five exhaustively listed matters (let. b); and
- the ability to bring about decisions that result in profit distributions or other dispositions of assets (let. c).
Para. 2, by contrast, lists the means through which control may be exercised, namely: agreements with shareholders, capital instruments, provisions of the deed of incorporation or articles of association, statutory and permanent agency relationships, fiduciary relationships and relationships between related persons. Para. 3 clarifies that control by other means may also be exercised indirectly, i.e. through interposed persons, legal entities or trusts.
This distinction must be strictly observed: a means listed in para. 2 does not in itself give rise to control. It must confer on the person concerned one of the forms of influence described in para. 1 or a comparable position. This is the most important limit on interpretation: it prevents control from being inferred from the mere existence of a shareholders’ agreement, a loan or a family relationship. Anyone who concludes that control by other means exists must therefore substantiate both levels separately – the means under para. 2 and the influence thereby obtained under para. 1.
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The decisive distinction: para. 1 applies per se, para. 2 requires an equivalence test
The burden of substantiation is allocated in fundamentally different ways between the two paragraphs. Regarding para. 1, the Federal Department of Finance’s (FDF) explanatory notes state that it lists the cases in which control by other means is to be assumed ‘in every case’. If one of the three scenarios is met, control exists without any need to assess the intensity of the influence separately. Nor is it permissible to object that the right is never exercised in practice or merely serves to protect minority shareholders or the investment. To that extent, the assessment is purely objective and formal and ends once the scenario is found to be met.
For para. 2, the position is the opposite: the assessment of the means of control ‘always depends on the individual case’. The question is whether they enable influence comparable to that conferred by a shareholding of 25 per cent or more. This equivalence standard is the central limit of the provision. The mere existence of a shareholders’ agreement, a profit-participating loan or a special provision in the articles of association does not give rise to a presumption of control. Rather, decisive influence must be positively established. It should be noted that the reference value depends on the level: 25 per cent is the standard at the first level. Where a means under para. 2 takes the place of the shareholding threshold of Art. 2 para. 2 TLEO at an intermediate level, it must be measured against the value of more than 50 per cent applicable there.
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Four reasons for a narrow interpretation
Art. 3 TLEO is the most open-ended provision of the first section: the word ‘in particular’ in the introductory sentence of para. 1 opens up the list, the terms ‘veto’ and ‘bring about’ are vague, the word ‘namely’ in para. 2 also opens up the list of means, and in addition to a ‘right’, the mere ‘actual ability’ is sufficient. Applied literally, almost any relationship of influence could be subsumed. Four reasons favour a narrow interpretation:
- A breach of the reporting obligation under Art. 43 TLEA is subject to criminal penalties. A provision whose breach is punishable by a fine must be sufficiently specific and, in case of doubt, interpreted narrowly.
- The Ordinance may not extend the statutory concept of control under Art. 4 para. 1 TLEA. Art. 3 TLEO therefore guides interpretation but does not create rights or obligations of its own.
- The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) standard on which the provision is modelled specifically does not call for an expansive application. The FATF Guidance 2023 requires ‘substantial control’ and responsibility for decisions that fundamentally affect the business or its general direction.
- Following the consultation, the Federal Council deliberately ‘narrowed’ the criteria and reworded the provision in order to distinguish more clearly between the subject matter and the means of control.
Noteworthy in this context is a statement in the explanatory report on the preliminary draft of the Act that has received little attention in the debate: natural persons holding less than 25 per cent of the participation rights are ‘normally not the beneficial owners’ of the legal entity. Where the shareholding threshold is not reached, the absence of control, not control, is therefore the rule. This confirms the exceptional nature of Art. 3 TLEO.
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The exhaustive list of veto rights in para. 1 let. b
In practice, the veto right under Art. 3 para. 1 let. b TLEO is the most significant. It gives rise to control only in respect of an exhaustively defined list of matters: change of the legal entity’s purpose, election of the executive management, amendment and expansion of the corporate strategy, budgets and investment planning, and equity and debt financing. The Federal Council thereby took up the criticism that the veto ‘against the company’s decisions’ provided for in the preliminary draft was too vague.
The limitation works in both directions. Within the list, control is to be assumed ‘in every case’, and the assessment is limited to whether the matter falls within the list. Outside the list, let. b contains no opening clause. This means, for example, that a veto over amendments to the articles of association, mergers, demergers, liquidation, relocation of the registered office, capital reductions or transfer restrictions does not fall within it and can give rise to control only via the introductory sentence, where the equivalence standard applies.
Four questions of interpretation arise equally for all five matters:
- The point of reference: a veto ‘over resolutions of the competent bodies’ is required. Contractual clauses that leave the resolution unaffected and merely trigger a contractual consequence (e.g. acceleration, termination, contractual penalty, purchase right) do not fall under let. b.
- The distinction from the statutory blocking minority: the mere arithmetical consequence of a qualified majority requirement under Art. 704 or 808b of the Code of Obligations (CO) is not sufficient; otherwise, any person with more than one third of the votes would exercise control, which at an intermediate level would undermine the threshold of more than 50 per cent under Art. 2 para. 2 TLEO. By contrast, consent requirements granted by contract or in the articles of association are covered.
- Neutrality as to legal form: the terms are to be understood functionally. In a limited liability company, the shareholders’ meeting and the managing directors take the place of the general meeting and the board of directors; for foreign legal entities, the functionally equivalent bodies are decisive.
- Overlaps: the five matters partly overlap – a significant acquisition may concern strategy, investment planning and financing at the same time. However, this is irrelevant, since it is sufficient for one matter to be covered.
One borderline case deserves particular attention: a quorum increased by the articles of association or by contract. If the quorum is set at 80 per cent, for example, any person holding more than 20 per cent can block the resolution. What matters is the basis of the veto position. There is no veto over a listed matter if the quorum is formulated in general and abstract terms and the blocking effect results solely from the size of the shareholding. In that case, the articles of association do not grant anyone a position but raise the requirements for everyone. By contrast, there is a veto over a listed matter if consent is required from a specific person or group, for example: ‘Resolutions on a change of purpose require the consent of shareholder group A.’ The circumvention limit must be observed: if the quorum is tailored to the shareholding of a specific person – for example, 76 per cent where the shareholding is exactly 25 per cent – and the circumstances show that the very purpose is to give that person a veto position, the clause must be assessed according to its economic substance. Indications include the proximity in time between the acquisition of the shareholding and the amendment to the articles of association, how precisely the quorum fits, and accompanying arrangements, such as an undertaking by the other shareholders not to lower the quorum without the consent of the person concerned.
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Three categories of veto rights – a working aid for reviewing agreements
In practice, a systematic division of veto rights into three categories is recommended.
| Category | Examples | Legal consequence |
| Listed rights (para. 1 let. b) | Consent requirement for change of purpose, election of the executive management, change of strategy, annual budget and investment plan, capital increase and raising of debt | Control ‘in every case’; no additional assessment of intensity; report regardless of size of shareholding and level |
| Rights outside the list | Veto over amendments to the articles of association, mergers, demergers, liquidation, relocation of the registered office, capital reductions, transfer restrictions, exclusion of subscription rights | No control by virtue of the list; only upon an overall assessment of all governance rights and if the equivalence standard is met (at least 25 per cent at the first level, more than 50 per cent from the second level) |
| Mixed rights | Veto over individual investments above a threshold, instrument-specific financing consent requirements, anti-dilution protection, consent requirements on price and terms | Assessment of whether the listed matter is covered comprehensively or only in a partial or peripheral area; in the latter case, equivalence test |
The guiding question for rights outside the list is: can the company form and implement its strategic will even if this shareholder withholds consent? If so, this indicates a mere protective right. If not, it indicates a strategic steering right. Mere minority protection rights will as a rule not meet the equivalence standard: they serve to protect the investment, not to steer day-to-day business operations, and they allow resolutions to be blocked but not brought about.
The borderline case arises particularly frequently in the area of financing. An example of a veto over a listed matter: ‘The annual budget and the investment plan require the consent of X.’ Here, X can block the planning as such. An example of a veto outside the list: ‘Investments exceeding CHF 5 million that are not provided for in the approved investment plan require the consent of X.’ Here, the planning remains unaffected, and the veto only applies to individual projects. Conversely, a formally limited clause may become a veto over a listed matter if it effectively cuts off financing, for example where the amount threshold is set so low that any practically significant raising of funds is covered.
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Cross-check: constellations without control
The negative delimitation is at least as important as the scenarios themselves. The following constellations do not in themselves give rise to control by other means:
- Loan covenants on market terms: the FATF expressly clarifies that a bank financing a legal entity rarely exercises control merely by doing so. Financial covenants, negative pledges, distribution restrictions and reporting obligations serve to secure repayment. They give the creditor the right to trigger acceleration, but not to determine the legal entity’s decisions. The position is different for a profit-participating loan with consent requirements or where the consent requirement is designed as a genuine reservation over resolutions, in particular where it is anchored in the articles of association or secured by a voting agreement.
- The position as an officer as such: members of the board of directors and the executive management do not become beneficial owners merely because they decide on the management of the business. Their powers are based on their position as officers and can be withdrawn at any time – they act for the legal entity, they do not determine its affairs. This is confirmed by the system under which the most senior member of the executive body is reported only on a subsidiary basis under Art. 4 para. 2 TLEA. If the position as an officer already constituted control by other means, the subsidiary report would be meaningless. The assessment is different for a de facto officer. The explanatory notes refer to the person who exercises significant influence over the executive management because she was previously a member of the board of directors, transferred her shares to her children and ‘did not really withdraw’. For the threshold, reference can be made to the Federal Supreme Court’s criteria on de facto officers, which require the taking of decisions reserved to the corporate bodies or the conduct of the actual management of the business. The powers must go well beyond preparatory work and amount to decisive participation in the decision-making process. In addition, acting in an isolated case is not sufficient.
- Advisers, statutory auditors and service providers: lawyers, fiduciaries, tax advisers and the statutory auditors often have considerable influence on decisions but do not exercise control. Their position is based on a mandate that can be terminated at any time and does not confer any power of determination. The distinguishing criterion is: does the person act for the legal entity, or does the person hold a position on behalf of someone behind them?
- Economic dependence: a key customer accounting for 80 per cent of turnover, a sole supplier, or a franchisor or licensor may create existential dependence. However, their influence concerns the company’s economic freedom of action, not its decision-making under corporate law, and therefore enables pressure but not decisions.
- Purchase rights not yet exercised: pre-emption, call and repurchase rights, conversion and option rights, as well as tag-along and drag-along clauses, confer a claim to a future acquisition, not a present power of determination. Since Art. 1 TLEO disregards them for the capital percentage and control is only acquired upon the transfer, it would be contradictory to bring them back in via Art. 3 TLEO. Control therefore only exists where the purchase right is combined with voting agreements, rights to issue instructions or far-reaching consent requirements.
- Related persons without influence: para. 2 let. f is a means of control (with the group of persons being determined under Art. 7 para. 5 of the Anti-Money Laundering Ordinance (AMLO)), not a scenario of control. The husband of the sole shareholder, the adult son without a shareholding and the sister of a member of the board of directors are not beneficial owners simply because they are related to a person who is a beneficial owner or exercises control. Otherwise, the legal entity would have to investigate the family circumstances of its shareholders. However, no such obligation is laid down in either the Act or the Ordinance.
- Pledges prior to enforcement: since the voting right remains with the pledgor, a security interest does not become a means of control merely because it could lead to control upon enforcement. The position is different, however, for pledges with a voting proxy or rights to issue instructions for the period prior to enforcement. A usufruct also confers the voting right under Art. 690 para. 2 CO, which is why a usufructuary may already be a beneficial owner under Art. 1 TLEO.
Art. 963 para. 2 CO can be used as a plausibility test for the means under para. 2 let. a–e that are based on an instrument. Where an instrument would not even trigger an obligation to consolidate under accounting law, a finding of control under Art. 3 TLEO requires particular justification. For purely de facto control, i.e. regarding let. f and de facto officers, there is no counterpart in accounting law, and the actual exercise of the power of determination must instead be demonstrated.
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Fiduciary arrangements, joint ventures and the chain of control
The fiduciary relationship has the longest history. The Federal Council’s draft provided for separate nominee provisions, which Parliament deleted. In substance, the constellation remains covered as a means of control under para. 2 let. e. It is not the shareholder acting as fiduciary who is the beneficial owner, but the principal or, where the principal is part of a chain, the natural person behind it. The resulting obligations are significant: the legal entity must establish the identity of both the principal and the fiduciary. The constellation always constitutes an indirect form of control, and a single fiduciary relationship in the chain is enough to trigger the obligation to obtain information under Art. 15 para. 1 let. b TLEO – regardless of the number of levels. However, this must be distinguished from an independent member of the board of directors, since acting for the account of another and on instructions is required.
In a joint venture with equal shareholdings, Art. 3 TLEO takes on significance of its own because the shareholding threshold does not apply. If natural persons each hold 50 per cent directly, both are already beneficial owners under Art. 1 TLEO. Art. 3 TLEO becomes relevant in practice where the partners are legal entities each holding 50 per cent at the intermediate level – and thus do not reach the more than 50 per cent required under Art. 2 para. 2 TLEO – or in multi-party joint ventures with, for example, five partners holding 20 per cent each. Three cases must be distinguished:
- In a genuine 50/50 set-up with mandatory joint strategic decisions, there is generally joint control. Precisely because no party can decide alone, each of them is deemed to hold control, namely over the entire joint venture company. However, this does not yet close the chain. For each party, it must be determined separately which natural person controls it. Example: A Ltd and B Ltd each hold 50 per cent of JV Ltd and manage it jointly; N1 holds 100 per cent of A Ltd, N2 holds 100 per cent of B Ltd – N1 and N2 must be reported.
- If, by contrast, there are only minority protection rights, there is no positive power of determination, and the report must be made on a subsidiary basis under Art. 4 para. 2 TLEA.
- In asymmetrical structures, the majority shareholder is captured through its shareholding. For the minority shareholder, the three-category division of veto rights is decisive.
For the chain of control, para. 3 must be observed. Unlike Art. 2 para. 2 TLEO, it does not provide for a threshold at intermediate levels, i.e. no percentage needs to be determined there. However, the depth of the assessment differs, and the scenarios of para. 1 apply equally at every level without any assessment of intensity. For example, anyone who can appoint the majority of the board of directors of a holding company controls it without holding a single share. And if the holding company holds at least 25 per cent of the legal entity subject to the reporting obligation, the person concerned is its beneficial owner. The means of para. 2, by contrast, must be measured against the standard appropriate to the level. In addition, forms of control can be freely combined within a chain: a shareholding at one level, a right to appoint officers at the next, and a shareholding again at the third. The legal entity must therefore examine at each level who exercises control and on what basis – in parallel rather than as a cascade. In other words, identifying a shareholding at one level does not release the company from also asking whether there is control by other means at that level.
A note on documentation: if an intermediate level is bridged not by a majority shareholding but by a veto right, the chain is, in our view, closed. Since the transmitting effect of a mere veto right – unlike a right to appoint officers – is doubtful and there is as yet no practice, it is advisable to explain additionally in the description under Art. 14 para. 1 TLEO why the veto position actually binds the intermediate entity in exercising its shareholding. This helps to pre-empt a different assessment by the control authority.
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Investigation and reporting
The investigation should be tailored to the means of control, as the six means differ fundamentally in how accessible they are. The legal entity must review the articles of association, the deed of incorporation and statutory or permanent agency relationships on the basis of its own documents – in particular for voting shares, nomination rights, consent requirements and quorum rules. The minutes of the general meeting and the board of directors must also be reviewed. In this respect, there is no information gap, and the legal entity cannot rely on a shareholder’s declaration. In short, anyone who overlooks a veto clause in their own articles of association is not protected. Shareholders’ and pooling agreements, capital instruments and fiduciary relationships, however, are typically not known to the company, which is why the disclosure statement is the standard instrument here. For relationships between related persons and de facto officers, the inquiry is generally not very fruitful. It is nevertheless advisable because it documents the investigation, even though one cannot rely on a de facto officer disclosing their influence. These constellations are mainly identified through recognisable indications, and the FATF classifies them in the register context as ‘in practice less relevant’ and assigns them to subsequent supervision by the authorities.
The disclosure statement should be designed as a single, comprehensive statement covering Art. 1–4 TLEO. With regard to Art. 3 TLEO, it should cover five points:
- Does the shareholder hold for its own account or for the account of another, and do third parties have rights to issue instructions or voting proxies?
- Are there any rights to appoint or remove members of the board of directors or the executive management?
- Are there any consent requirements concerning the five listed matters?
- Are there any rights to determine profit distributions or other dispositions of assets?
- Are there any options, conversion rights, profit-participating loans or comparable instruments, and are they combined with participation rights in decision-making?
It is advisable to ask about rights rather than types of agreement: do not ask ‘Is there a shareholders’ agreement?’, but rather ‘Are there any rights to determine or block the election of the executive management, on whatever basis?’ Otherwise, positions based on the articles of association, de facto positions and orally agreed positions will be missed. The statement takes the place of submitting the agreement. The submission of the complete set of agreements is not required, as there is a legitimate interest in keeping provisions on price, succession and exit confidential. Confirmation is sufficient, accompanied in cases of doubt by an extract of the relevant clauses.
On the reporting side, Art. 14 para. 1 TLEO requires additional information on how control is exercised; the mere designation ‘by other means’ is not sufficient. The FDF’s example 1.3 illustrates the application: for a person with the right to appoint or remove more than half of the members of the board of directors, the register contains two entries on the type of control, namely ‘By other means: right to appoint / remove the majority of the members of the board of directors’ and ‘Direct’, while the ‘Extent’ field remains blank because no threshold can be stated. If, by contrast, control is based on a determinable shareholding – for example, where a fiduciary holds 60 per cent for the principal – the ranges under Art. 13 para. 1 TLEO must also be reported pursuant to Art. 14 para. 2 TLEO. The pairs of terms in Art. 12 TLEO must always be addressed in full: alone or acting in concert, direct or indirect, through a shareholding or by other means. An imprecise description increases the risk rating under Art. 64 para. 3 let. c TLEO and thus the likelihood of an inspection.
Importantly, however, a precautionary report should not always be made in case of doubt. Under Art. 7 para. 2 TLEA, the legal entity does not owe certainty, but a review that is appropriate in the circumstances. Over-reporting burdens the person concerned with a register entry that they must then have removed under Art. 38 para. 4 TLEA in conjunction with Art. 62 TLEO, and gives the authorities an inaccurate picture of the control relationships. Anyone who identifies an indication, for example dividends paid to a third-party account, a board member who regularly receives instructions from outside or a shareholder’s refusal to cooperate, must investigate these circumstances and report only if necessary. If the investigation is inconclusive, this should always be documented.
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A look at the EU and conclusion
The EU Anti-Money Laundering Regulation (Regulation [EU] 2024/1624, AMLR), applicable from 10 July 2027, provides for a separate control test that functionally corresponds to Art. 3 TLEO: it captures anyone who exercises de facto control below the shareholding threshold, i.e. who can exercise significant influence and impose relevant decisions. The lists largely coincide. Nevertheless, four differences are significant:
- The AMLR contains no list of matters corresponding to the list of veto rights, but links veto rights to the interest in the company. The three-category division can therefore not simply be transposed.
- The AMLR defines indirect control as requiring direct control to be established at each level, whereas under the ownership test it conversely calculates through the levels.
- The AMLR combines the parallel assessment with a risk-based lowering of the threshold to no more than 15 per cent, which the TLEA does not provide for.
- The level of detail differs: Art. 3 para. 1 let. b TLEO expressly lists the matters relevant to control, whereas the AMLR is content with the vague notion of ‘relevant’ veto and decision-making rights. The Commission’s announced guidelines with case examples have not yet been published.
Anyone assessing a governance structure under both regimes must qualify the veto rights twice – once against the list in Art. 3 para. 1 let. b TLEO and once against the more open standard of the AMLR. For groups with an EU nexus, the survey of shareholders should therefore be broader than Art. 3 TLEO requires.
In summary, Art. 3 TLEO can be distilled into one principle: control by other means requires a company-related, permanent and present power to determine the decision-making process that, depending on the level, is equivalent to a shareholding of at least 25 per cent or of more than 50 per cent, and that can usually be traced back to an agreement, the articles of association or a statutory agency relationship. Mere advice, mere market power, mere proximity, mere expectancy and mere indications are not sufficient. This is subject to the scenarios of para. 1, under which control is to be assumed in every case and at every level if they are met.
Five steps are recommended in practice:
- Collect all governance documents: articles of association, shareholders’ and pooling agreements, loan and convertible instruments, joint venture agreements, powers of attorney;
- Assess each consent and veto right individually by subject matter, frequency and strategic relevance and allocate it to one of the three categories;
- Examine in parallel whether there is also a direct or indirect shareholding or acting in concert;
- Design the disclosure statement by reference to rights and as a single, comprehensive statement covering Art. 1–4 TLEO; and
- Formulate the description under Art. 14 para. 1 TLEO on a case-specific basis and document your own assessment, including the reasoning, in accordance with Art. 8 TLEA.
Here too, the documentation serves, on the one hand, as exculpatory evidence against the criminal penalties under Art. 43 TLEA and, on the other, as the basis for any request for correction or deletion and as a means of defence in proceedings before the control authority.
Overview: frequently asked questions on Art. 3 TLEO
Can someone be a beneficial owner without holding shares?
Yes. Art. 3 TLEO captures anyone who controls a legal entity without reaching the shareholding threshold – in extreme cases without holding a single share.
Does every veto right give rise to control?
No. Only a veto over the five listed matters in Art. 3 para. 1 let. b TLEO gives rise to control in every case: purpose, election of the executive management, corporate strategy, budgets and investment planning, and financing. Other veto rights give rise to control only if the equivalence standard is met.
Are lenders, board members or advisers beneficial owners?
As a rule, no. Loan covenants on market terms, the position as an officer as such and advisory mandates do not in themselves give rise to control; the position may be different for a de facto officer.
Who must be reported in a fiduciary arrangement?
Not the shareholder acting as fiduciary, but the principal or the natural person behind it; the legal entity must establish the identity of both.
Should a precautionary report be made in case of doubt?
No. Under Art. 7 para. 2 TLEA, what is owed is a review that is appropriate in the circumstances; the investigation and its outcome should be documented.
This article is part of our series on the new Transparency Act. In the first two parts, we covered the direct holding of shareholdings (Art. 1 TLEO) and indirect holding through a chain of control (Art. 2 TLEO); an overview of the key changes is provided in the article ‘The new Transparency Act (TLEA): overview of the key changes’. In the next article, we will cover acting in concert (Art. 4 TLEO). For further reading: Vogel, Orell Füssli Kommentar zum TJPG und zur TJPV.





